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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates the determinants of ownership structure and adjustments 
in ownership for Norwegian private firms. We find that firm characteristics such 
as size, riskiness, profitability, growth prospects, leverage and liquidity have a 
significant impact on concentration, but much of the variation in ownership 
structures is explained by an unobserved heterogeneity component. When 
investigating the drivers of adjustments we establish that previous ownership level 
together with the lagged changes in concentration, firm riskiness, profitability and 
share owned by families are significant predictors of a subsequent change in 
ownership concentration. To our knowledge, this paper is the first to take both a 
static and dynamic approach in the study of ownership concentration in private 
firms and it sets the ground for further research on ownership in private firms.   
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1. Motivation 
 
The debate around firm ownership in the corporate governance literature is almost 
one century old. By looking at the ownership structure of US firms, Berle and 
Means (1932) were the first to notice a trend of dispersed ownership. They then 
raised the hypothesis that ownership diffuseness adversely affects firm 
performance. Today, after Markowitz, the benefits of portfolio diversification 
have become well-known; thus it is puzzling that many firms still have 
concentrated ownership. What determines their owners to hold large stakes 
despite the undiversification costs they are bearing? And what makes them change 
their stakes in time? 
The view on owners shifted from mere capital providers in the classical theory of 
the firm to important factors influencing the behavior of firms, in the governance 
theory paradigm. There is a wide variation in ownership patterns today and the 
focus in the literature on corporate ownership has been mainly on the relationship 
between ownership and performance. One direction of research is to examine the 
differences in performance for firms with various ownership structures. 
Conversely, an alternative direction is to assume that ownership is determined by 
the particularities of each firm and its contracting environment. According to this 
view, each firm will adjust its ownership in response to particular factors facing 
the firm, in order to reach an optimal ownership structure.  
Following the latter view, our paper investigates the role of firm characteristics in 
explaining the variation in ownership structure. We explore how ownership 
structure adjusts to changes in firm-specific factors, in accordance with the value 
maximizing mechanisms of the firm. 
Although private firms represent the largest fraction in the economy, most studies 
consider listed companies, which are more accessible in terms of the information 
available. We choose to focus exclusively on non-listed firms and explore whether 
the theory developed on public companies applies despite the particularities of 
private firms. 
We use rich panel data on Norwegian firms, well suited for identifying patterns in 
the evolution of ownership concentration. Our study brings additional evidence 
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for the ownership endogeneity hypothesis. Observable firm characteristics along 
with unobserved differences between firms determine ownership concentration. 
We find that firm characteristics have a significant impact on concentration, but 
much of the variation in ownership structures is explained by an unobserved 
heterogeneity component. When investigating the drivers of adjustments we 
identify factors that are significant predictors of a subsequent change in ownership 
concentration. 
To our knowledge, this study is among the first few that provide empirical 
grounds for the further development of a theory on ownership in private firms. 
This paper is structured as follows: section 2 provides a review of the existing 
literature on the topic, based on which we derive predictions in section 3; the data 
and descriptive statistics are presented in section 4; in section 5 we investigate the 
determinants of the level of and changes in ownership concentration; we conclude 
in section 6. 
2. Literature review 
 
The corporate governance model of the firm treats ownership as a governance 
mechanism, as opposed to the classical model in which the owner’s main function 
was of providing capital. In the governance model owners are able to shape the 
firm’s behavior and the way it creates shareholder value. When the manager is the 
sole owner, he or she appropriates the entire firm value. The existence of outside 
shareholders leads to an agency relationship between owners and managers, as 
first introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). The authors highlight the costs 
associated with such a relationship and present managerial ownership as one way 
of mitigating agency costs. They further develop a theory of the ownership 
structure of the firm from the agency perspective, approach which has later 
become central to the corporate ownership literature.  
2.1. Berle and Means thesis 
Berle and Means (1932) were the first who advanced the idea of a relationship 
between ownership and performance, noticing a trend of increased ownership 
diffuseness in the 1930s. A major implication of what was later referred to as the 
Berle and Means thesis is that there is an inverse relationship between ownership 
diffuseness and firm performance. The authors infer that the resulting separation 
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of ownership and control creates favorable conditions for the transfer of profits 
from the shareholders to the controlling groups, given that the two parties 
naturally have conflicting interests. On one hand, more concentrated ownership 
provides incentives for monitoring management and reduces the discretionary 
power of officers in allocating the firm’s resources. On the other hand, controlling 
blockholders may channel resources away from the firm, in order to serve their 
own interests. However, it is not evident which effect dominates. The Berle and 
Means thesis is the starting point of a series of empirical studies on the 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. 
2.2. Exogenous ownership  
Two directions of research followed the Berle and Means thesis. Building on their 
arguments, a series of papers have researched how dispersed ownership affects 
firm performance. Gugler (2001) collects a set of articles among those written 
over a period of 70 years on the topic. The findings are rather ambiguous, with 
most of the evidence supporting either a positive or no relationship from 
ownership concentration to firm performance. Findings of an inverse relationship 
are less common (Agrawal and Knoeber 1996; Bøhren and Ødegaard 2006). 
Morck et al. (1988) attribute the ambiguity of previous findings to the non-
linearity of the true relationship between the two. Examining insider ownership, 
they find evidence of a non-monotonic relationship: positive up to a level of 5% 
and negative afterward.  
A common finding in countries from Continental Europe is that beyond a certain 
level of ownership concentration, large owners expropriate minority shareholders 
and expropriation is more pronounced in countries with low shareholder 
protection (Gugler 2001). Both large shareholders and investor protection are key 
elements of a successful governance system (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). 
Ownership tends to be more concentrated in countries with a legal regime that 
provides low investor protection (La Porta et al. 1998). La Porta et al. find a 
systematic variation in the ownership patterns across four major legal regimes. 
Since the legal environment is exogenous to all firm-specific factors, the direction 
of causality must go from the legal origin to the ownership structure. Thus the 
authors provide evidence that ownership concentration is determined by factors 
outside the firm. Although they document ownership variation across legal 
regimes, their paper does not explain the variation within a regime.  
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2.3. Endogenous ownership  
Demsetz (1983) was the first to advance the hypothesis of endogenous ownership 
structure. Optimal ownership concentration is due entirely to firm characteristics, 
more specifically to the firm’s main activity, as reflected by its internal processes, 
its scale of operations and the inside owners’ managing abilities. Demsetz 
concludes that “no single ownership structure is suitable for all situations if the 
value of the firm’s assets is to be maximized” (p. 386). 
In a later study, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) test empirically for the endogeneity of 
ownership on a sample of 511 US public firms. In the first set-up, they examine 
how ownership concentration responds to four factors: a. firm size, b. control 
potential – profit potential from exercising more effective control, c. systematic 
regulation – constraints imposed on the scope and impact of shareholder decisions 
and d. amenity potential – owners’ potential for consumption of goods obtained 
through the firm’s business. The determinants above explain at least 30% of the 
variation in ownership concentration, which is measured as the fraction held by 
the five largest owners. In the second set-up, they test the existence of a linear 
relationship between ownership diffuseness and the firm’s accounting profit rate 
and find that the two are unrelated. The results are robust to alternative 
concentration measures.  
Using a similar approach and a subsample of firms from the Demsetz and Lehn 
study (1985), Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) claim they find strong evidence of 
the endogeneity of ownership structure. With respect to the determinants of 
ownership concentration, the authors argue that market forces yield firm specific 
ownership structures. Variation across firms emerges because of differences in the 
circumstances facing each firm, more specifically economies of scale, regulation 
and the stability of the environment in which they function. In addition, they find 
that ownership has no effect on performance when using a simultaneous equations 
system, therefore including profitability as an explanatory variable for the 
variation in ownership structure would raise no concerns about a potential 
simultaneity bias. Findings from using a simultaneous equations approach are 
questioned by Bøhren and Ødegaard (2006). They analyze the interaction between 
a set of governance mechanisms and firm performance and find that the majority 
of the relationships which were significant in single equations disappear when 
using simultaneous equations. The authors suspect this happens more likely 
9 
 
because the theory is partial and underdeveloped and fails to impose proper 
restrictions on the simultaneous system, rather than because of the nature of the 
relationship between governance and performance itself.  
A step further in developing the ownership endogeneity hypothesis is made by 
Cho (1998) who investigates the relationship between insider ownership, 
investments and corporate value. He finds evidence that investment affects 
corporate value, which in turn alters the ownership structure, but he finds no 
support for the reverse relationship. The author concludes that assuming the 
ownership structure to be exogenous can lead to biased estimates and 
misinterpreting the results. Subsequently, Himmelberg et al. (1999) examine the 
hypothesis that managerial ownership is linked to firm characteristics that affect 
contracts, and find that the proxies for what they call the contracting environment 
of the firm are strong predictors of managerial ownership structure. Several other 
studies on insider ownership support the ownership endogeneity hypothesis 
(Holderness, Kroszner, and Sheehan 1999; Loderer and Martin 1997). 
Given that ownership is endogenous, a description of the mechanism which links 
firm characteristics with ownership concentration is found in a survey by 
Holderness (2003). He asserts that block ownership is attractive because it gives 
blockholders access to both shared and private benefits of control. As large 
owners have higher incentives to monitor actively and to advise management, 
shared benefits of control will stem from such a concentration of control. In 
contrast to shared benefits of control, only the blockholders can enjoy private 
benefits of control and the more profitable the firm is, the higher the private 
benefits that can be extracted. As the scale of both shared and private benefits is 
prone to vary with firm characteristics, ownership concentration should vary 
systematically in accordance with firm characteristics that are related to benefits 
of control (Demsetz and Lehn 1985). 
2.4. Ownership dynamics 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) suggest the study of a dynamic firm model regarding 
changes in the contracting environment which would further explain the 
relationship between ownership and performance. Such an approach is attempted 
by Zhou (2001) who examines the relation between managerial ownership and 
equity-based incentives. In a study of 619 US firms over 5 years, the author 
10 
 
documents the relatively low variation in a firm’s managerial ownership across 
time compared to the significant variation in cross-sectional variation. The insight 
is that small changes in managerial ownership are unlikely to yield changes in 
managerial incentives and thus have an effect on firm performance. He implies 
that if there is any relationship, it would most likely be identifiable in cross-
sectional analyses. 
While Zhou (2001) studies contemporaneous changes, Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2009) confront the endogeneity problem by examining the impact of lagged 
changes in firm characteristics on changes in insider ownership. They use a set of 
firm-specific financial and non-financial measures as proxies for information 
asymmetry. They find evidence that the fraction held by managers is more likely 
to fall when the firm was performing well and its asset value was growing. 
However, when the firm stock was doing poorly managerial ownership is not 
more likely to increase and there is a weak relationship between past poor firm 
results and increases in the managers’ stake. Similarly, they analyze the 
relationship between lagged ownership changes and changes in Tobin’s Q as a 
proxy for performance. Their results show that an increase in managerial 
ownership is associated with a subsequent improved firm performance, but a 
decrease in managerial ownership does not appear to be followed by a decline in 
firm value. 
In a study on US IPOs, Helwege et al. (2007) investigate the determinants of large 
decreases in managerial ownership. They identify stock market liquidity as a 
driver, along with firm-specific factors, such as good recent stock performance, 
high stock liquidity and high market valuation. 
Urosevic (2001) addresses theoretically another dimension of public firms – the 
pressure on the stock price driven by information asymmetry. Because outside 
investors perceive the sale of shares by insiders as lack of commitment, the 
resulting decrease in the stock price leads to a “race to diversify” among insiders. 
This race translates into a dynamic stake adjustment towards the optimal 
allocation and its speed increases with the number of insiders. Thus both Helwege 
et al. (2007) and Urosevic (2001) provide more insight into how a mix of factors, 
both endogenous and exogenous to the public firm, drive adjustments in the 
ownership structure. 
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Dynamic stake adjustment is researched by Heiss and Köke (2004) on a sample of 
both private and public German firms. They conclude that firm characteristics 
together with the existing level of ownership concentration contribute to altering 
the ownership structure. Dewaelheyns and Van Hulle (2010) conduct one of the 
few studies that focus exclusively on private firms. They investigate the 
relationship between firm leverage and whether the firm belongs to a business 
group and find significant differences in the capital structure. In addition, 
affiliation to a business group leads to more frequent adjustment in the leverage 
level.  
Public firms represent the focus in the existent literature on ownership and its 
relation to both firm-specific and external factors. In contrast, the theory regarding 
ownership in non-listed companies is underdeveloped and it is also unclear 
whether the mechanisms that apply to public firms are also valid for private ones. 
2.5. Contribution 
Following the direction initiated by Demsetz, we investigate the role of firm 
characteristics in explaining the variation in ownership. We examine the 
dependence between the levels of variables as well as the dynamics of ownership 
and how they relate to changes in the firms’ features. We find that several firm 
characteristics are strong predictors of both levels and changes in ownership 
concentration. To our knowledge, this paper is one of the first to take both a static 
and dynamic approach in the study of ownership concentration. In addition, it 
represents a building block for empirical research on private firms. 
The quality and size of our data set are unique. We use a sample of private firms 
that is representative for the entire industrial sector of the Norwegian economy. 
The database contains rich panel data on all the main firm characteristics. By 
analyzing the patterns of ownership in private firms, we provide an original 
insight into the drivers of private shareholdings adjustment.  
3. Empirical predictions 
 
 The drivers of ownership are both observed (for instance, financial performance) 
and unobserved (such as intangible assets or managerial ability). As follows from 
the existing literature, they are related to either the firm’s environment or 
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macroeconomic factors.  
The underlying assumption in our analysis is that ownership is endogenous. We 
focus exclusively on the factors relating to the firm and control for observable 
external drivers. To our knowledge, such factors have been identified to be 
regulation (La Porta et al. 1998) and stock liquidity together with market 
valuation (Helwege, Pirinsky, and Stulz 2007). The effects of capital market 
valuation and stock liquidity are negligible as we study private firms. As far as 
regulation is concerned, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) expect greater diffuseness in 
more strictly regulated industries because regulation restricts the potential for 
discretionary managerial behavior and provides to some extent cost-free 
management monitoring. For our analysis, we control for the effect of regulation 
by excluding firms in heavily regulated industries, such as financial and utilities, 
so that the firms in our sample become more homogenous from a regulatory point 
of view. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) identify firm size as an important determinant of 
ownership structure. As firm size increases, the price of a given ownership 
fraction increases and therefore shareholders need to commit more capital to 
maintain their existing stake. In itself, this effect implies a more diffuse 
ownership. In addition, shareholders are risk averse and maximize their own 
utility based on the return they are getting and the risk they are bearing. By tying 
up more of their wealth into the firm, they would bear an undiversification risk for 
which they are not compensated. However, if a group of owners chooses to 
concentrate and monitor management, the value added would be captured by all 
stockholders (including passive ones), unlike the undiversification risk which 
affects owners individually. We expect the net cost of concentration to be higher 
for owners of larger firms and thus, we predict an inverse relationship between 
firm size and concentration. 
As far as the development stage of the firm is concerned, Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2009) point out that particularly young firms are characterized by high growth 
opportunities and that in such firms ownership is more likely to be concentrated 
in the hands of owner-managers. As the firm matures and it becomes larger, we 
expect owners to diminish their stakes.  
Selling shares in private firms requires a demand for such shares, which can be 
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influenced by firm performance. Empirical findings (for instance Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001)) usually show an inverse relationship from performance to 
concentration. When the firm exhibits good financial results, owners relinquish 
more control and have better opportunities to cash out, leading to a decrease in 
concentration. In addition, in a study on financial contracting, Aghion and Bolton 
(1992) argue that it is optimal for financiers to retain more control in the bad state, 
leading to more concentrated ownership. Similarly, it is optimal for shareholders 
to have tighter control in firms with a higher risk profile. Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) define it as the owner’s control potential, meaning the profit achievable 
through closer management monitoring. More stable environments imply easier 
monitoring, which in turn disciplines management. A more concentrated structure 
would bring no additional value to the owners. As the environment becomes more 
risky, tighter control brings greater payoff to the shareholders through higher 
concentration.  
Cost-free monitoring can be obtained from increased firm leverage, as governance 
theory advocates. Banks are potentially active monitors given their interest in 
securing repayment as well as their control rights resulting from lending contracts. 
However, for private firms there is higher information asymmetry between 
owners and insiders on one hand and creditors on the other hand, which leads to 
more credit rationing for private firms. Firm growth will be financed through 
equity if the firm has little access to debt financing. In this case, the largest owner 
either commits more capital, thus keeping his or her stake or dilutes it as a result 
of outside investors providing capital. It is not clear which of the effects 
dominates. 
Firm liquidity is also a feature that has an impact on concentration through the 
opportunities it creates for extracting private benefits. We expect to find a positive 
association with concentration because owners would be less likely to give away 
control in firms with a large amount of cash on the table.  
Another driver of ownership concentration is what Demsetz and Lehn (1985) call 
the amenity potential of a firm’s output. They define it as the capability of owners 
to impose their personal preferences and influence managers’ decisions with 
regard to the goods produced by the firm. Media and sports firms are examples of 
firms in which increased owner control allows for expressing the owner’s 
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particular taste. This type of potential is expected to give rise to more 
concentrated ownership than what would be predicted only by size and control 
potential.  
The testable implications above are derived from the theory and empirics on listed 
firms. In the following, we relate to them as the building block in analyzing 
private firms’ behavior. 
4. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
We test our predictions by examining the relationship between ownership 
structure and firm characteristics in two set-ups based on the assumption that 
ownership structure is endogenous. In the first set-up we investigate how a given 
set of firm characteristics relates to the ownership structure of the firm. In the 
second set-up we look at changes in firm specific factors and the resulting 
probability of a change in the ownership structure. 
4.1. Data 
Our data consist of an unbalanced panel of firms made available by the Center for 
Corporate Governance Research (CCGR) at BI Norwegian Business School. The 
database contains accounting data, industry NACE codes (companies can be 
classified as having several NACE codes) and governance data on ownership. The 
data panel consists of Norwegian non-listed firms. The sample period spans from 
2000 to 2009, excluding 2006, for which accurate data were not available.  
In this paper we study ultimate ownership, a concept advocated by La Porta et al. 
(1999). As opposed to direct ownership, this method identifies the true owners of 
a firm, after accounting for the complexities of ownership structures, such as 
pyramids and cross-ownership. Ultimate ownership therefore provides a more 
accurate image of who owns the private firms in our sample. A weakness of using 
ultimate ownership is that the resulting share of the largest owner might exceed 
100% due to errors in the summing of the control stakes. This is the case for 36 
firms in our sample, which we exclude from our analysis.  
As opposed to cross-sectional data, panel data have unique characteristics, which 
make it suitable for exploring issues such as persistence, change, growth and 
developmental processes. The disadvantages come from subject attrition and 
relatively short time span (Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). 
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4.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 gives an overview of the distribution of the annual ownership 
concentration across firms. 
 
Table 1. 
Ownership concentration (percentage held by the largest owner) by year 
 
This table shows summary statistics for ownership concentration data by year. The panel is 
constructed by applying a set of filters in order to improve data integrity for the purpose of our 
paper. We impose a non-negativity condition on revenues, total assets and fixed assets and a non-
zero condition on revenues and total assets. We exclude firms with no employees, firms for which 
we cannot establish the industrial sector in which they operate or for which we have missing 
values on any of the variables in the model. To control for outliers, all variables are winsorized at 
the 1 and 99% level, respectively. After filtering, the sample consists of 158 720 different firms 
resulting in 718 364 firm-year observations. The percentage held by the largest owner is recorded 
at the end of the calendar year. We report the annual mean and median values and percentiles 5, 
20, 25, 35, 60, 65 and 75 for our sample. The overall values comprise all firm-year observations. 
 
During the sample period the average ownership concentration constantly 
increased. The trend can be observed from both the rising values of the mean and 
median concentration, but also from the increase in the proportion of firms with 
higher ownership levels. This indicates that when modeling ownership one must 
control for annual variation in the variables.  
The average firm in our sample has a high ownership concentration, of over 60%. 
More than a quarter of the firms have a sole owner. Given this distribution of 
ownership, we consider firms with low concentration as having less than 40% 
(20
th
 percentile) and firms with high concentration as having above 80% (60
th
 
percentile).  
As ownership is assumed endogenous to the firm, different levels of ownership 
concentration should be accompanied by differences in firm characteristics. In 
Table 2 we present a set of financial and ownership measures by ownership 
concentration and by change in ownership, respectively. 
Table 2 provides preliminary evidence of the relationship between the specificities 
of ownership structure and firm characteristics in private firms. 
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Table 2. 
Firm characteristics by concentration and change in ownership 
 
The first 3 columns of this table report means and medians for the pooled firm-year observations 
grouped by ownership concentration into high, medium and low. We define the cutoff points for 
the three categories as percentiles 20 and 60, corresponding to a fraction owned by the largest 
owner of 40 and 80%, respectively. Columns 4 to 6 report means and medians across firm-year 
observations for which there has been no change, a negative or a positive change in ownership 
compared to the previous year. Columns 5 and 6 display the test for statistical differences between 
the means (standard t-test) and medians (Wilcoxon rank-sum test). The differences are reported 
between change (positive and negative, respectively) and no change. Ownership concentration is 
expressed as the percentage of equity held by the largest owner and the cumulative share of the 
first two and three largest owners, respectively. The Herfindahl index measures concentration on a 
scale from 0 to 1, where 1 represents the highest concentration. Firm characteristics are measured 
as follows: size – the natural log of sales; firm riskiness – the variation in sales over the previous 
three years; growth prospects – the geometric average of the annual sales growth rate over the 
previous three years; debt level – debt over assets and liquidity – the quick ratio. We also report 
the fraction owned by the largest owner in a media firm, the share owned by the firm’s CEO and 
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the cumulative share owned by officers and directors together. A series of dummy variables are 
further displayed, isolating firms which belong to the media industry, are owned by a family or the 
largest owner belongs to a specific group, as listed in the table. Family ownership is defined as the 
cumulative ownership share of direct or ultimate owners, board member or CEO, where the family 
is defined by the CCGR as a group of persons related by blood and marriage (Berzins, Bøhren, and 
Rydland 2008). A firm is accounted as a family firm if more than 50% of the shares are held by a 
family and the grouping by owner type is based on mutually exclusive categories. A more detailed 
description of the variables is provided in Table 4. All variables are in real terms, adjusted for 
inflation in accordance with the Consumer Price Index published by Statistics Norway (Statistics 
Norway. Standard Industrial Classification  2011). 
 
With respect to size, the smallest firms have the highest concentration and the 
average size is higher for firms which experienced at least one change. The larger 
the firms become, the more diffuse their ownership structure is.  
More than 50% of firms with medium and highly concentrated ownership have 
the CEO as the largest owner and on average, the CEO stake is slightly lower than 
that of the largest owner. However, it seems that the second and/or third largest 
owners are usually directors. Such a setting makes the first agency problem less 
obvious than in public firms where managerial stock ownership is smaller and 
usually offered for incentive and interest alignment purposes. In addition, when 
the CEO holds the largest stake, fewer changes in the ownership structure occur. 
The tendency is even more pronounced for family firms or when the ultimate 
owner is a person.  
The pattern for concentration changes entails special attention. Cases in which no 
change takes place refer to the firms having the highest concentration level. Firms 
with lower concentration tend to become even less concentrated, one possible 
explanation being the illiquidity of the market for private firm shares. Owners of 
highly concentrated firms are undiversified, possibly due to an inability to sell 
part of their stake. On the same note, growth prospects seem to enhance the 
demand for shares. 
The relationship between performance measured as ROA and ownership 
concentration is not straightforward. The dependence appears hump-shaped, 
which is puzzling. One potential explanation might be the high variation in the 
variable and large extreme values (unreported standard deviation is lowest for 
medium concentration firms). However, there might as well be an economic 
explanation for the phenomenon, which we fail to provide. The mean debt ratio 
also follows a hump-shaped pattern, but in this case the median values are almost 
the same, indicating that lower debt levels are more frequent. Also, firms which 
do not experience a change seem to have the lowest leverage. 
Contrary to our predictions, firm riskiness does not change significantly for 
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different ownership levels (steady around 25%), and ownership concentration for 
media firms is very similar to that of the average private firm.     
We distinguish between four investor types: international, institutional, state, and 
individual owners (persons), as defined by Bøhren et al. (2009). Table 3 provides 
an overview of changes by owner type for our sample. 
Table 3. 
Number of changes between investor types 
 
This table shows the number of changes in ownership by type of owner, for firm-year 
observations. It does not include firms for which we could not identify the type of the largest 
owner, resulting in 43 692 firm-year cases in which there has been a change. They represent 
6.082% out of the total cases in which there has been a change. Columns 2 to 5 show the number 
of cases in which the largest owner changed to person, state, international, and institutional, 
respectively. Column 6 displays the total number of firms that changed the owner type, from 
person, state, international, and institutional, respectively.   
Out of the total firm-year observations, more than 90% did not experience a 
change. When a change takes place, the largest owner usually remains a person 
(88.9% of the cases). Ownership will most likely be transferred to the same type 
of owner (96.6% cases). When it changes to another owner type, it is least likely 
that the state was or will become the largest owner. It is more common to have 
transactions between an individual owner on one side, and institutional or 
international owners, on the other side. Given that persons are the predominant 
type of owner in private firms, and shifts between owner types happen in only 
3.4% (1485) of the cases, we will not further investigate this direction. 
For our study, we choose to analyze the relationship between ownership changes 
by type of change (positive, negative, no change), as described in Table 2, given 
the significant differences in firm characteristics between the groups. 
5. Methodological approach and results 
 
In this section, we present a longitudinal analysis in two set-ups. The first set-up is 
a fixed effects regression model for variables measured as levels. The second one 
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shifts focus on changes in the variables and employs conditional fixed effects logit 
regression. The section ends with an assessment of the statistical and economic 
significance of the variables and robustness tests. 
5.1. Variables and model specification 
Table 4 contains summary definitions of the variables used in our analysis. A 
more detailed description of the underlying rationale for using these measures 
follows. 
 
Table 4. 
Definition and description of variables 
Variable Description 
Ownership concentration 
Ownership Concentration Percentage of equity held by the largest owner in the current year. 
We apply the logistic transformation:  	 
Herfindahl index Ownership concentration index calculated as the sum of square 
equity fractions in the firm. 
CEO Ownership Percentage of equity held by the CEO in the current year 
D&O Ownership Percentage of equity held by directors and CEO in the current year 
Family Ownership Percentage of equity held by family in the current year 
  
Size 
Size (sales) The natural log of annual operating revenue.  
  
Firm-specific  risk 
Firm risk 
 
The previous 3 years standard deviation of sales scaled by the 3-
year average sales level, according to the formula: 
 

 	
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 !
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Profitability 
ROA Return on assets, as EBIT to total assets at the end of the year. 
  
Growth prospects 
Growth prospects Geometric average growth in sales over the previous 2 years.  
  
Leverage 
Leverage Year-end debt to assets ratio. 
  
Liquidity 
Firm liquidity Year-end quick ratio calculated as current assets less inventories to 
current liabilities.  
  
Amenity potential 
Media Dummy variable taking the value 1 if the firm belongs to the 
media industry and 0 otherwise.  
  
 
We measure ownership concentration as the fraction owned by the largest owner 
because our sample displays high concentration, thus making the fraction held by 
the five largest owners (used by Demsetz et al. (1985; 2001)) an ineffective 
measure. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) engage in a critique of the fraction 
owned by the largest owner when testing agency theory-based predictions. They 
argue that such a measure is inadequate if it proxies for managerial ownership as 
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well. There is high correlation (0.921) between ownership concentration and 
managerial ownership in our case, but our predictions, although derived from a 
theory on public firms, are not strongly rooted in agency theory. Therefore, their 
critique has limited reach for the purpose of our study. 
Size is measured in the literature either as the natural logarithm of sales 
(Himmelberg, Hubbard, and Palia 1999), log of market value of common equity 
(Demsetz and Lehn 1985) or of book value of assets (Demsetz and Villalonga 
2001; Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2009). We consider appropriate to use the natural 
logarithm of sales instead of assets, because the firms in our sample operate in 
diverse sectors, which can lead to significant differences in the value of assets (for 
instance, between a firm in the manufacturing industry and one in the services 
industry). Operating revenue captures the core business development and excludes the 
part of revenue that is not related to the firm’s main activity. We also include a 
quadratic size term in order to account for the functional dependence. 
As a proxy for the instability of the firm’s environment we use the relative 
standard deviation of sales. Calculated over a three-year window, this measure of 
firm riskiness shows how volatile the yearly operating revenues of a firm are and 
controls for the size of those revenues. 
ROA is our proxy for firm performance because it reflects the firm’s operating 
performance and moreover, the value creation in the firm for both equity- and 
debt-holders. The drawback is that ROA is an accounting measure and it can be 
manipulated through accounting artifacts like earnings management. Given that 
we are studying private firms, we believe the pressure related to “making the 
numbers” is relatively small and thus we consider ROA as a suitable measure, 
reflecting the firm’s true operating performance.  
We define the growth prospects of a firm as its expected increase in annual sales. 
We assume that owners observe the past change in operating revenue and expect a 
similar evolution in the future. Therefore we use the past two-year average growth 
in sales as a proxy for future growth.  
Leverage is measured as total debt over total assets. We use total debt because it 
reflects the financial burden of the firm.  
As far as liquidity is concerned, the quick ratio measures the ability of a firm to 
pay its current liabilities from assets which can be easily converted into cash. For 
the purpose of our paper, the ratio measures the cash at hand existent in the firm.  
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To account for the amenity potential we use a dummy variable that takes a value 
of one if the firm belongs to the media industry and zero otherwise.  
Industry dummy variables are created by classifying the firms in the sample into 
seven industry sectors (Agriculture, forestry, fishing, mining; Manufacturing, 
chemical products; Energy; Construction; Service; Trade; Transport) based on the 
Standard Industrial Classification codes (Statistics Norway. Standard Industrial 
Classification  2011). The industry classification is as defined by the CCGR 
(Berzins, Bøhren, and Rydland 2008) and a detailed description follows in 
Appendix 1. 
 
5.2. Fixed effects linear estimation 
The descriptive evidence in section 4.2 gives a first indication of the relationships 
between ownership concentration and its determinants. In this section we present 
an econometric model for explaining these associations and we further comment 
on the results. 
According to our theoretical framework, the firm-related factors which determine 
ownership concentration are both observable and unobservable. We approximate 
the observable characteristics with the variables measured as described in the 
previous section. The unobservable factors are referred to as unobservable firm 
heterogeneity. Himmelberg (1999) provides a series of examples that illustrate 
this concept (p. 357-358). A longitudinal design enables us to control for the 
unobserved firm heterogeneity. Baltagi (2005) points out the main advantages and 
drawbacks of working with panel data. First, such data allow us to eliminate 
potential bias by controlling for individual heterogeneity. Second, panel data 
contain more information and variability and lead to less collinearity among the 
variables, more degrees of freedom and more efficiency. Third, a panel is more 
suited for investigating the dynamics of adjustments, as it allows for the 
identification and measurement of effects that are unobservable in cross-section or 
time-series alone. The disadvantage lies in a usually short time-series dimension, 
as in our case. In addition, there is a risk of cross-section dependence, which 
could affect inferences. 
In general terms, a linear model of endogenous ownership can be written as: 
$%& ' ( ) * + ,%& ) -%& , 
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where $%& is the concentration level for each firm i in year t, ,%& is the set of 
explanatory variables and -%& stands for the error component. The explanatory 
variables in the model are lagged one year in order to control for potential 
endogeneity. We assume that owners do not take more than one year to respond to 
the observed behavior of a firm. In the form written above, the explanatory 
variables are observed firm characteristics. Not accounting for firm heterogeneity 
would result in a bias in the OLS estimator because the unobserved effects will be 
captured in the residuals: 
-%& ' .% ) /%&, 
where .% is a time invariant parameter specific to each firm and /%& stands for 
stochastic disturbances. Assuming that µi elements are fixed parameters, one can 
include a matrix of individual dummies, Zit, in the regression and estimate each µi: 
$%& ' ( ) *0 + ,%& ) .0 + 1%& ) /%& 
The above is called a fixed effects estimator. Baltagi (2005) notes that such a 
model is appropriate when we are interested in the behavior of a specific number 
of firms.  
When working with panel data, two main econometric models are available – 
fixed effects and random effects. Our choice is motivated by the fundamental 
difference between the two models. A fixed effects model assumes that the 
subjects (in our case, firms) are fixed and they form the population we are 
interested to draw inferences upon. Keeping the subjects “fixed” means that we 
are not interested in the variation between, but the variation within them. Thus, 
the inferences we make apply to the specific sample we look at. By contrast, in 
the random effects model, the subjects are randomly drawn from the population, 
and we rely on the variance between them in order to say something about the 
entire population. Our sample includes almost all Norwegian private firms, thus 
the fixed effects model would provide an accurate description of the present 
relationships between variables. However, if the number and average 
characteristics of firms fluctuate significantly in the future, the inferences drawn 
from estimating the model may no longer be valid. 
Moreover, a fixed effects model enables us to control for time-invariant variables 
that differ between firms and are correlated with the explanatory variables. 
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Random effects models control for such variables as well as for variables that 
vary over time but are constant across firms and are assumed uncorrelated with 
the regressors. The Hausman test (Appendix 2) rejects the null hypothesis of no 
correlation between individual effects and the regressors at the 0.1% significance 
level, which is in favor of the fixed effects model. 
For the variables in our study, the model translates into the following simplified 
form: 
23456789:%& ' ( ) *;9<5%& ) *=;9<5%&= ) *>?96@A97B%& ) *CA2D%&
) *EF63G8%& ) *HI5JG%& ) *K9L-9M9G$%&
) *ND@549G$%& ) /%& 
The model results presented in Table 5 indicate that agency theory is applicable to 
a lesser extent to the private firms in our sample.  
 First, the diversification reason appears to be a main driver of concentration. As 
expected, the larger and/or riskier the firm, the less concentrated ownership is. 
Contrary to Demsetz and Lehn’s (1985) findings, owners appear to be more 
concerned about mitigating portfolio risk, rather than the potential profit 
achievable through closer management monitoring. This may be due, in fact, to 
the high insider ownership, which makes the first agency problem negligible in 
private firms. In addition, by comparing the first two columns, we see that 
variables size and firm risk no longer have statistical significance, possibly 
because they are correlated with the time component.  
Second, the marginal effect of profitability is negative as expected, although 
surprisingly small. Contrary to our prediction, the growth prospects of a firm seem 
to have a negative impact on concentration. One reason may be that both 
characteristics are associated with better performance, which may facilitate access 
to external financing, thus making it likely for the existing owners to sell part of 
their shares to outside investors.  
Third, the coefficient for leverage supports the access to financing prediction, thus 
firms that are able to leverage up can finance their growth in operations through 
debt rather than equity. Another explanation is that private firms may be part of a 
business group, thus having access to an internal capital market, which again 
allows owners to keep large stakes. 
The only variable that is not statistically significant is the amenity potential 
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achievable in private media firms, perhaps because the largest and most influential 
media trusts in Norway are listed companies. 
 
Table 5. 
Fixed effects linear regression results for ownership concentration 
 
This table displays coefficients of the fixed effects regression of ownership concentration level on 
lagged firm characteristics. Columns 1 and 2 show the results of firm fixed effects with and 
without year fixed effects, respectively. Columns 3 and 4 display the results of industry fixed 
effects with and without year fixed effects, respectively. Intercept terms are included for all 
regressions, but not reported. The *, **, *** indicate that the coefficients are statistically 
significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The number of observations represents the total 
firm-year cases in the sample. The number of groups refers to the number of firms for the first two 
columns and the number of mutually exclusive industry sectors for the last two columns. The 
overall R-squared shows the proportion of variance explained by the regressors. The adjusted R-
squared takes into account the number of explanatory variables. The fraction explained by firm 
heterogeneity is the proportion of the total variance in resulting from the panel-level variance 
component. For the first two columns this variance component is not part of the overall R-squared 
as it is for the last two columns.  
 
The low R-squared is due to the large fraction of the cross-sectional variation that 
is explained by unobserved firm heterogeneity. More than 80% of the variation in 
ownership concentration is driven by unobserved differences between firms. In 
the first and third columns we see that the coefficients for ROA, firm risk and 
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liquidity change signs. One possible explanation is that unobserved firm 
heterogeneity that is not controlled for in the industry effects set-up is correlated 
with observed firm characteristics which biases the coefficients in the industry 
effects regression.  
Taken together, the results presented above show that observable firm 
characteristics influence ownership concentration. There are notable differences 
compared to results from previous studies on public firms, which casts 
considerable doubt on the asserted effects of agency theory implications for 
private firms. 
 
5.3. Conditional fixed effects logistic estimation 
In addition to examining the determinants of ownership concentration levels, in 
this paper we also investigate the drivers of adjustments in ownership 
concentration. Measuring changes provides additional insight into the way 
ownership concentration adjusts to the variation in the set of determinants.  
The univariate results presented in Table 2 show that there are statistically 
significant differences between characteristics of firms which experienced a 
change in ownership structure and those which did not. Moreover, for one third of 
the firm-year observations in the sample, the largest owner has an equity share of 
100%. As Woolridge (2001) notes, in such a case a non-linear model might be 
more appropriate. The dependent variable is defined as equal to 1 if there is a 
change in ownership concentration compared to the previous year and 0 
otherwise. Each year, a firm can either maintain the same level of concentration or 
change it, thus we employ the following models: negative change, positive change 
and change (either positive or negative). The interest lies in the probability of a 
change occurring, conditional on changes in firm characteristics in the year prior 
to the change in ownership and on unobservable firm heterogeneity. Similar with 
the previous model for levels of concentration, the logistic regression model 
accounts for the unobserved firm heterogeneity through the fixed effects 
estimator.  For our study, the model can be expressed as follows: 
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where Λ(•) is the logistic cumulative distribution function.  
The dependent variable is calculated as change in current year (compared to the 
previous one G ] G ^ S	 and transformed in a dichotomous variable. The 
independent variables are calculated as lagged differences from G ^ _ to G ^ S. 
Ownership concentration is a persistent variable, therefore both the previous level 
of concentration and any change it might have suffered in the past year may have 
an influence on the likelihood of a subsequent change in control. In addition, since 
many private firms in our sample are owned by families, we include a family 
ownership variable, measured as the difference in the fraction held relative to the 
previous year.  
In Table 6 we report the estimation results. Changes in several firm characteristics 
are significant predictors of positive, negative and overall changes in ownership 
concentration. In addition, our model is consistent across the three categories of 
change in ownership. 
High previous ownership concentration is likely to remain that way or decrease in 
the following year. However, changes in concentration, if they occur, will lead to 
more concentrated structures, tendency which can also be noticed in Table 1. In 
addition, there are more cases where the change is positive rather than negative. 
Firms that become larger are more likely to experience a decrease in concentration 
and less likely to have an increase.  
When adopting a dynamic perspective, risk becomes an important driver of more 
concentrated structures, as advocated by Demsetz and Lehn (1985). The odds that 
a riskier firm will experience a change in ownership increase with 17.8% over 
those of a less risky firm, with each unit of risk. When also considering the results 
from our levels model, we see that riskier firms which have diffuse ownership are 
likely to change to more concentrated structures.  
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If the outlook of a firm improves, the ownership structure will be less likely to 
change, but if it does, it will become more diffuse as owners sell their fraction 
rather than increase it. Both higher ROA and higher growth have a small effect on 
the increase in the odds of ownership becoming more diffuse, rather than 
concentrated.  
Table 6. 
Conditional fixed effects regression results for changes in ownership concentration 
 
 
This table presents coefficients of the conditional fixed effects logit regression of changes in 
ownership concentration on lagged changes in firm characteristics. Columns 1, 2 and 3 show the 
results of the estimation including year fixed effects, for an overall change, positive change and 
negative change in ownership, respectively. The *, **, *** indicate that the coefficients are 
statistically significant at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively. The number of observations 
represents the number of firm-year cases for which a certain type of change occurred. The number 
of groups refers to the number of firms. The associated p-value for the Chi-square test statistic 
leads us to conclude that at least one of the regression coefficients is not equal to zero. 
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Contrary to our prediction, we find that more leveraged firms are more likely to 
experience a change and to become more concentrated. 
The negative coefficients for family ownership indicate that ownership tends to be 
more persistent in family firms. If the largest owner is a family, it is less likely 
that the ownership concentration will change, which can be explained by the 
tendency of family owners to keep the shares in the family and pass the firm 
ownership to the heirs rather than sell to outside investors. 
One pitfall is pointed out by Falenbrach and Stulz (2009) who analyze the 
determinants of large increases and decreases in managerial ownership and find 
that the level of significance drops when they re-estimate the regressions using 
lower thresholds. We do not use a threshold when defining changes in ownership 
concentration, thus it might be that by eliminating small changes in ownership 
concentration from our analysis the significance of the variables would increase. 
5.4. Robustness 
To verify whether our results are sensitive to the proxies we use, we test our 
models using alternative measures for our dependent variable as well as for the 
explanatory variables. In addition, we check whether attrition in the sample has 
any influence on the reliability of our findings. 
In the following we test whether using alternative measures produces results that 
differ noticeably from our findings presented in this paper. Since there are many 
commonly accepted measures for ownership concentration and for the firm 
characteristics, it is not evident that the measures we use in our base-case model 
are the most appropriate.  
First, we replace the measure fraction owned by the largest owner with the 
Herfindahl index. The index contains information about the fractions owned by all 
owners, thus there is more variation in the dependent variable, compared to our 
base case model. The explanatory variables are the same as the ones used in the 
base-case model. Second, we use alternative measures for several explanatory 
variables: log of book value of assets for size, variability of the growth rate in 
sales for firm risk, geometric average of the annual growth rate in operating 
income over the previous three years for growth prospects and return on equity 
(ROE) for profitability. 
One weakness of using an unbalanced data panel is that we are unable to establish 
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the reasons for which firms disappear from our dataset. We cannot distinguish 
between the disappearance of a firm due to bankruptcy and that due to a corporate 
restructuring activity that leads to the creation of a new firm. If the latter is the 
case, we do not account for such changes in ownership since we measure changes 
across time for the same firm. In order to control for attrition in our sample, we 
take a balanced panel and run our regressions for both levels and changes in 
ownership. 
The results from our robustness tests are presented in Appendix 3. When 
comparing the results from the fixed effects linear regressions (Panel A) we find 
that both size and its quadratic term are robust to all variations. In contrast, 
liquidity is the most sensitive measure, changing sign in Alternative 1 and losing 
significance in both Alternative 1 and 3. Using Alternative 2 leads to loss of 
significance for risk and debt. The profitability measure (ROA) changes sign and 
keeps significance in Alternative 2, but the magnitude of the effect is very small. 
We conclude that our model is most sensitive to the use of alternative explanatory 
variables (Alternative 2) and least sensitive to sample attrition (Alternative 3). 
In Appendix 3 we also provide the robustness results for the logistic regression. 
Panels B, C and D refer to the all changes, positive changes and negative changes 
model, respectively. Out of the ownership-based variables, the most stable are 
previous ownership concentration and the lagged change in ownership, while 
family ownership changes sign and significance for the negative change model 
(Panel D). Another point is that there are variables (risk and profitability) which 
lose significance under Alternative 2 and others (size and growth) which become 
significant under Alternative 3. Under Alternative 2 our set-up shows the highest 
instability for all three models (all changes, positive changes and negative 
changes), while under Alternative 3, the positive change model displays the 
highest stability. The drawback of using different measures for the explanatory 
variables (Alternative 2) is that we obtain missing values, which decreases sample 
size. This leads to inefficiencies and to a potential selectivity bias if the firms 
eliminated from our analysis differ systematically from those remaining. 
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6. Concluding remarks 
 
Our study provides an improved understanding of the determinants and dynamics 
of the ownership structure of private firms. Taking the view that ownership is 
endogenous, we analyze the relationship between several observed firm 
characteristics and ownership concentration on a sample of Norwegian non-listed 
firms. The estimation method enables us to control for unobserved heterogeneity 
among firms. We find that features such as firm size, riskiness, profitability, 
growth prospects, leverage and liquidity have a significant impact on 
concentration, but much of the variation in ownership structures is explained by 
the unobserved heterogeneity component, similar to what Himmelberg et. al. 
(1999) found. Our results support the findings of Demsetz and Lehn (1985) with 
regard to the negative effect of size. The positive effect of leverage is contrary to 
the results of Demsetz and Villalonga (2001), but the significant negative effect of 
performance on ownership supports their findings. 
We then turn to investigating the drivers of adjustment in ownership. We estimate 
a logistic regression to establish how changes in firm characteristics affect the 
likelihood of a change in ownership concentration. Our results show that previous 
ownership level together with the lagged changes in concentration, firm riskiness, 
profitability and share owned by families are significant predictors of a 
subsequent change in ownership concentration. These findings are consistent with 
those of Büchelhofer (2008), who studies ownership changes in Chinese listed 
firms, although the explanatory variables in his study are measured as levels and 
not changes.  
Overall, the firm’s contracting environment has modest explanatory power on 
changes in ownership, as there is a high degree of heterogeneity among private 
firms. While public firms must fulfill a set of requirements in order to become 
listed, private firms can range from start-ups to mature, well-developed 
companies. Due to differences in the stages of development of private firms, the 
governance mechanisms can apply to different extents. Another challenge in 
studying private firms is the degree of illiquidity of the shares, a likely driver of 
the ownership structure. To our knowledge, a proxy for such a liquidity variable 
has yet to be identified. Matching private and public firms according to similar 
characteristics would provide a measure of liquidity for private firms, based on 
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the stock liquidity of listed firms, since other differences have been controlled for. 
This will provide additional insight into what drives ownership concentration. 
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to take both a static and dynamic 
approach in the study of ownership concentration in private firms and sets the 
ground for further research on ownership in private firms. In addition, the rich 
panel data explored in this study, covering almost all Norwegian private firms, is 
well suited for extended analyses of ownership structure in private firms. 
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Appendix 1. Classification of industries by sectors 
 
Industry Sector Standard Industrial Classification 
Agriculture, forestry, 
fishing, mining 
Agriculture, hunting and related service activities 
Forestry, logging and related service activities 
Fishing, fish farming and related service activities 
Mining of coal and lignite, extraction of peat 
Mining of uranium and thorium ores 
Mining of metal ores 
Other mining and quarrying 
Manufacturing, 
chemical products 
Manufacture of food products and beverages 
Manufacture of tobacco products 
Manufacture of textiles 
Manufacture of wearing apparel, dressing and dyeing of 
fur 
Tanning and dressing of leather, manufacture of luggage, 
handbags, saddlery, harness and footwear 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture, manufacture of articles of straw and 
plaiting materials 
Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and 
nuclear fuel 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
Manufacture of basic metals 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except 
machinery and equipment 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Manufacture of office machinery and computers 
Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. 
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Manufacture of radio, television and communication 
equipment and apparatus 
Manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 
Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 
Energy Extraction of crude petroleum and natural gas, service 
activities incidental to oil and gas extraction excluding 
surveying 
Construction Construction 
Service Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and 
motorcycles, retail sale of automotive fuel 
Hotels and restaurants 
Real estate activities 
Renting of machinery and equipment without operator 
and of personal and household goods 
Computers and related activities 
Research and development 
Other business activities 
Education 
Health and social work 
Activities of membership organizations n.e.c. 
Activities of households with employed persons 
Extra-territorial organizations and bodies 
Trade Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 
Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
Repair of personal and household goods 
Transport Land transport; transport via pipelines 
Water transport 
Air transport 
Supporting and auxiliary transport activities, activities of 
travel agencies 
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Appendix 2. The Hausman test result 
 
 
The Hausman test is a specification test which, when applied to panel data models, tests the 
orthogonality condition of the random effects model. If the regressors in a model are correlated 
with the unobserved factors, only the fixed effects estimator is consistent. Otherwise, the fixed 
effects estimator is still consistent, but inefficient while the random effects estimator is both 
consistent and efficient. The Hausman test statistic has a chi-square distribution and Prob>Chi2 is 
equal to the probability of the null hypothesis, that the estimates generated by the two models 
differ meaningfully. This means that the orthogonality assumption is violated, thus a random 
effects estimator is inconsistent.   
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Appendix 3. Robustness tables 
 
Panel A. 
Robustness results for the fixed effects linear regression 
 
This panel presents the results of our base-case model as well as three variations. In Alternative 1 
the dependent variable is replaced with the Herfindahl concentration index, on which we apply a 
logistic transformation and the independent variables are the same as in the base-case model.  In 
Alternative 2 size is measured as the log of total assets, firm-specific risk as the standard deviation 
of the sales growth rate over the past three years, growth as the geometric average of the annual 
growth rate in operating income over the previous three years and profitability as ROE. The 
measures for debt, liquidity and amenity are the same as in our base-case model. To preserve 
consistency in the treatment of outliers, all the new variables used in the robustness tests are 
winsorized at the 1
st
 and 99
th
 percentiles. Alternative 3 represents the base-case model applied on a 
balanced data panel which we obtain by eliminating the observations corresponding to those firms 
for which we have missing values for at least one year. 
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Panel B. 
Robustness tests for the conditional fixed effects logistic estimation on all changes in 
ownership concentration 
 
Panels B, C and D present the results of our base-case logit model as well as three variations. 
Alternatives 1, 2 and 3 respectively are constructed similar to the ones described in Panel A. 
Instead of using levels of variables, we measure changes from G ^ _ to G ^ S. Panel B refers to all 
changes in ownership (both positive and negative), Panel C only to positive changes and Panel D 
only to negative ones. 
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Panel C. 
Robustness tests for the conditional fixed effects logistic estimation on positive changes in 
ownership concentration 
 
Panels B, C and D present the results of our base-case logit model as well as three variations. 
Alternatives 1, 2 and 3 respectively are constructed similar to the ones described in Panel A. 
Instead of using levels of variables, we measure changes from G ^ _ to G ^ S. Panel B refers to all 
changes in ownership (both positive and negative), Panel C only to positive changes and Panel D 
only to negative ones. 
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Panel D. 
Robustness tests for the conditional fixed effects logistic estimation on negative changes in 
ownership concentration 
 
Panels B, C and D present the results of our base-case logit model as well as three variations. 
Alternatives 1, 2 and 3 respectively are constructed similar to the ones described in Panel A. 
Instead of using levels of variables, we measure changes from G ^ _ to G ^ S. Panel B refers to all 
changes in ownership (both positive and negative), Panel C only to positive changes and Panel D 
only to negative ones. 
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Motivation 
 
This paper investigates the role of firm characteristics in explaining the variation 
in ownership structure across private companies, if ownership structure is 
endogenous and thus reflects the value maximizing mechanisms of the firm. 
Unlike the classical model of the firm where the owner’s main function was of 
providing capital, the corporate governance model treats ownership as a 
governance mechanism. The role of owners does not resume only to providing 
capital, but also consists in shaping the firm’s behavior and the way it creates 
shareholder value. Large shareholders have the incentives and the ability to collect 
information and monitor management, thus addressing the first agency problem 
by assuring that managers’ interests are aligned with their own – value creation 
and profit maximization (Shleifer and Vishny 1997). Ownership matters for the 
firm’s behavior and performance. 
Berle and Means (1932) were the first who advanced the idea of a relationship 
between ownership and performance, noticing a trend of increased ownership 
diffuseness in the 1930s. They discuss that the resulting separation of ownership 
and control creates favorable conditions for the transfer of profits from the 
shareholders to the controlling groups, given that the two groups naturally have 
conflicting interests. The implication is that more concentrated ownership 
provides incentives for monitoring management and reduces the discretionary 
power of officers in allocating the firm’s resources. However, another point is that 
controlling block-holders may channel resources away from the firm, in order to 
serve their own interests. A major implication of what was later referred to as the 
Berle and Means thesis, is that there is an inverse relationship between ownership 
diffuseness and firm performance. 
Two directions of research followed the Berle and Means thesis. Building on their 
arguments, a series of papers have researched the effects of ownership 
concentration on firm performance. Gugler (2001) gathers a set of articles among 
those written over a period of 70 years on the topic. The findings are ambiguous, 
with most of the evidence supporting either a positive or no relationship from 
ownership concentration to firm performance. A common finding in countries 
44 
 
from Continental Europe is that beyond a certain level of ownership 
concentration, large owners expropriate minority shareholders. Expropriation is 
more pronounced in countries with low minority shareholder protection.  
The connection between ownership concentration and the legal climate is an 
aspect researched by La Porta et al. (1998), who find that ownership tends to be 
more concentrated in countries with a legal regime that provides low investor 
protection. They observe a systematic variation across legal regimes, but their 
paper does not explain the large variations within a regime. 
Fifty years after the Berle and Means thesis, Demsetz (1983) challenged their 
arguments and advanced the hypothesis of endogenous ownership structure, 
resulting from decisions which reflect shareholders’ influence and trading in the 
equity market. In a later study, Demsetz and Lehn (1985) test empirically for the 
endogeneity of ownership structure, defined as ownership concentration. They 
introduce four firm-specific factors that alter ownership structure: firm size, 
control potential, systematic regulation and amenity potential. 
The authors define on one hand the risk neutral effect of size. As firm size 
increases, the price of a given ownership fraction increases and therefore 
shareholders need to commit more capital to maintain their existing stake. In 
itself, this effect implies a more diffuse ownership. On the other hand, 
shareholders are risk averse and maximize their own utility based on the return 
they are getting and the risk they are bearing. By tying up more of their wealth 
into the firm, they would bear an undiversification risk for which they are not 
compensated, which again implies greater ownership diffuseness. In addition, the 
disadvantage of disperse ownership translates into passive owners. However, if a 
group of owners chooses to concentrate and monitor management, the value 
added would be captured by all stockholders, unlike the undiversification risk 
which affects owners individually.  
The disadvantages are expected to be higher than the advantages, such that the net 
cost of concentration is generally higher for owners of larger firms. We test the 
inverse relationship between firm size and concentration, in the sense that changes 
in the size of the firm would lead to an adjustment of the ownership structure to a 
level that best suits the stockholders. 
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The next determinant of ownership concentration, control potential, is the profit 
potential achievable through closer management monitoring. This arises because 
management and owners have diverging interests. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) take 
the view that owners are able to influence to some extent the risks and 
opportunities facing the firm and are able to discipline management. The authors 
argue that the profit potential from exercising control is correlated with the 
stability of the firm’s environment. More stable environments imply easier 
monitoring, which naturally disciplines management. A more concentrated 
structure would bring no additional value to the owners. As the environment 
becomes more risky, tighter control brings greater payoff to the shareholders. We 
therefore test for a positive relation between firm-specific risk and ownership 
concentration. 
Further on, the two authors consider regulation an explanatory factor of the 
ownership structure, because first, regulation restricts the control potential of 
owners and second, it provides to some extent, cost-free management monitoring. 
They expect greater diffuseness in more strictly regulated industries. However, for 
our analysis, we control for the effect of regulation by using a sample of firms that 
are homogenous from a regulatory point of view. Unlike previous studies on the 
subject, which analyze samples of public firms, our sample consists entirely of 
Norwegian private firms that activate in industries with a similar level of 
regulation. We exclude public firms and also firms in heavily regulated industries, 
such as financial and utilities. 
Another driver of ownership concentration is what Demsetz and Lehn (1985) call 
the amenity potential of a firm’s output. They define it as the capability of owners 
to impose their personal preferences and influence managers’ decisions with 
regard to the goods produced by the firm. Media and sports firms are examples of 
firms in which increased owner control allows for expressing the owner’s 
particular taste. This type of potential is expected to give rise to more 
concentrated ownership than what would be predicted only by size and control 
potential. They found more empirical support for excess ownership concentration 
in media firms. Given the large influence of the media industry today, we include 
it in our analysis, expecting to find that it explains residual ownership 
concentration in private media firms. 
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The Demsetz and Lehn study (1985) treats ownership structure as endogenous to 
firm characteristics, in order to further examine how firm performance is 
influenced by ownership structure. 
In a later study, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) investigate as well the possibility 
that ownership structure itself is affected by firm performance. Their view is that 
it is more plausible that firm performance affects ownership than the other way 
around. Demsetz and Villalonga illustrate this through the example of a 
management leveraged buy-out and stock options as a form of management 
compensation, given that inside owners’ expectations about future performance 
play a major role in altering the ownership structure. 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) provide evidence that firm performance 
determines ownership structure, but do not find support for the reverse 
relationship, when ownership structure is treated as endogenous to firm 
performance within a system of simultaneous equations. These findings imply that 
including firm profitability as an explanatory variable for the variation in 
ownership structure would raise no concerns about a potential simultaneity bias. 
Another determinant of ownership concentration is brought up by Urosevic 
(2001), who addresses the issue of insider ownership dynamics with respect to the 
interaction among risk-averse insiders facing a moral hazard problem. Inside 
investors willing to diversify strategically sell their stakes taking into account that 
outside investors are risk-averse and perceive the sale of shares by inside owners 
as evidence of their lack of commitment. This translates into a “race to diversify”, 
as the insider who sells second will receive a lower share price. The result is a 
dynamic stake adjustment towards the optimal allocation, whose speed increases 
with the number of insiders. 
 
Literature Review 
 
The focus in the literature regarding ownership is the relation between firm 
performance and ownership concentration, where firm performance is 
endogenous. Traditionally, governance mechanisms have been assumed 
exogenous and determining corporate value. 
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The Berle and Means thesis is the starting point of a series of empirical studies on 
the relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. Since the 
advancement of their theory, a lot of attention has been given to establishing the 
nature of the relationship. Most of the papers that tackled the subject have found a 
positive or no relationship (Gugler (2001) provides a detailed analysis of country 
reports). Findings of an inverse relationship are less common, i.e. Agrawal and 
Knoeber (1996), Bøhren and Ødegaard (2004). 
To our knowledge, a first attempt in examining the determinants of the ownership 
structure itself is made by Demsetz (1983) who challenges the Berle and Means 
thesis and brings up the issue of ownership structure endogeneity. Furthermore, he 
states that optimal ownership structure is due entirely to firm characteristics, more 
specifically to the firm’s main activity, as reflected by its internal processes, on its 
scale of operation (and therefore size) and on the inside owners’ managing 
abilities. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) first analyze the determinants of ownership structure 
and then assess the consequences of diffuse ownership structure for the 
performance of the firm, arguing that the two variables should be unrelated. They 
find that firm size, control potential, systematic regulation and amenity potential 
have a significant impact on ownership concentration in the anticipated direction. 
In the same time, they approach the issue of endogeneity using simultaneous 
equations and find that ownership has no effect on performance. 
Following the direction initiated by Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Cho (1998) applies 
the same approach when investigating how ownership structure affects 
investments and corporate value. Regressions of insider ownership on the level of 
investments and investments on corporate value suggest a significant non-linear 
relationship between ownership structure and corporate value. Further on, he 
explores the possibility that insider ownership, investment and corporate value are 
endogenously determined. By estimating a simultaneous equations system, he 
finds evidence that investment affects corporate value, which in turn alters the 
ownership structure, but he finds no support for the reverse relationship. The 
author concludes that treating ownership structure as exogenous severely affects 
the results from OLS regressions on single equations. 
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Using a similar approach, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) claim they found 
unequivocal evidence for the endogeneity of ownership structure. Findings from 
using a simultaneous equations approach are questioned by Bøhren and Ødegaard 
(2004). They analyze the interaction between a set of governance mechanisms and 
the economic performance of the firm and find significant relationships that are 
robust across a wide range of single equation models. However, when using 
simultaneous equations, the majority of relationships disappear. The authors 
suspect this happens more likely because the theory is partial and underdeveloped 
and fails to impose proper restrictions on the simultaneous system, rather than 
because of the nature of the relationship between governance and performance 
itself. 
At this stage of the theory there is still an open debate whether ownership 
concentration is exogenous to firm performance or endogenously determined by 
it. 
With respect to the determinants of ownership concentration, Demsetz and 
Villalonga (2001) argue both theoretically and empirically that market forces 
yield firm specific ownership structures, either diffused or concentrated. Variation 
across firms emerges because of differences in the circumstances facing each 
firm, more specifically economies of scale, regulation and the stability of the 
environment in which they function. 
As far as the dynamics of ownership structure is concerned, a study that treats the 
variables as changes versus changes is Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009). They 
examine the determinants of large changes in ownership structure, which they 
measure as changes in managerial ownership. They use a different estimation 
technique, logit and probit regressions, and find evidence that the managerial 
ownership fraction is more likely to fall when the firm was performing well and 
its asset value is growing. However, when the firm stock is doing poorly 
managerial ownership is not more likely to increase and there is a weak 
relationship between past poor firm results and increases in the managers’ stake. 
The authors found evidence to support the so-called “financing reason”: 
managerial ownership is a cheap source of financing for financially constrained 
firms, therefore managers’ stake increases for firms that have become more 
leveraged. 
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Himmelberg et al. (1999) signal that most studies use managerial ownership only 
as explanatory variable, without considering potential endogeneity issues. They 
use panel data to examine the hypothesis that managerial ownership is linked to 
firm characteristics that affect contracts, and found that the proxies for what they 
call the “contracting environment” of the firm are strong predictors of managerial 
ownership structure. Another important finding is that managerial ownership and 
firm performance are determined by several common characteristics in the firm’s 
contracting environment. 
The interaction between inside and outside owners is an aspect researched by 
Gregoric et al. (2008), having as sample period the post-privatization years in 
Slovenia. They find empirical evidence of the competition for private benefits 
among owners during transition. Owner’s behavior varies between listed and non-
listed firms. In non-listed firms, the competition for control takes place mainly 
among outside and inside owners. Outside investors that are of similar kind and 
hold similar stakes tend to share control. With the purpose of extracting rents, 
they form coalitions that concentrate ownership beyond the optimal level in a 
transition period. In the case of listed firms, ownership concentration is more 
likely to occur when the firm is performing well since the non-largest investors 
are more inclined to sell their shares to the largest owner. 
The existing literature has focused mostly on the relation between governance and 
performance, with ownership as the most researched among governance 
mechanisms. The theory regarding ownership is not fully developed and there is 
no general consensus regarding the interaction between the governance 
mechanisms or between governance and performance. 
 
Methodology 
 
We use a sample of panel data from the Center for Corporate Governance 
Research at BI Norwegian School of Management. The database contains 
accounting data, industry NACE codes (companies can be classified as having 
several NACE codes), and governance data regarding the owners. It consists of 
Norwegian non-listed firms and includes a subsample of family firms. The sample 
period is from 2000 to 2009. 
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For the set of variables that enter the model we report the following descriptive 
statistics: mean, median, maximum, minimum, standard deviation.  
We examine the relationship between ownership structure and firm characteristics 
in two set-ups. In the first setting we investigate how a given set of firm 
characteristics relates to the ownership structure of the firm. In the second setting 
we look at the relationship between changes in the variables and to what extent 
changes in the firm’s features alter the ownership structure. 
In the first setting, all variables are measured in levels and the model can be 
summarized as: 
The dependent variable: Ownership concentration, measured by the fraction 
owned by the largest owner, and denoted OC. 
The explanatory variables: 
a) Firm size, as book value of assets, Size_asset. 
b) Firm-specific risk, as relative standard deviation of sales, SD_sales. 
c) Profitability, as return on capital employed, ROCE. 
d) Leverage, as debt-to-assets, D/A. 
e) Growth prospects, as average percentage growth in sales, Growth_prev. 
f) Managerial ownership, as fraction owned by officers, MO. 
g) Indicator variable for firms in the media industry, as a dummy variable, M. 
We measure ownership concentration as the fraction owned by the largest owner. 
In contrast, Demsetz et al. (1985; 2001) use the fraction held by the five largest 
owners. Using the same measure as they did in our sample of private firms would 
result in very little variation in the dependent variable, due to high ownership 
concentration in the private firms. Therefore, the largest owner measure is more 
appropriate for our purpose. We consider ultimate ownership as opposed to direct 
ownership, in order to allow for transparency in the assessment of ownership 
structures. Using ultimate ownership provides insight into the complexities in the 
chain of control. 
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To measure firm size, we use the average annual book value of assets. Although 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) use the market value of equity as a proxy for firm size, 
they report that the findings are robust to using other measures, i. e. the book 
value of assets. In accordance to the theory previously outlined, we expect to find 
a negative relation. 
We measure the relative riskiness of the firm by the difference between the ratio 
of the firm’s standard deviation of sales to its average sales and the ratio of the 
industry’s standard deviation of sales to industry average sales. Because the 
standard deviation measure alone does not account for firm size, we divide each 
term by the average sales, in order to eliminate the influence of size. We expect to 
find a positive relation between the stability of the firm’s environment and its 
ownership concentration. 
The measure for profitability, return on capital employed, is the ratio of operating 
profit to capital employed. Capital employed is defined as working capital plus 
non-current assets. ROCE reflects the firm’s ability of generating profits given the 
level of its assets, acting also as a measure of the firm’s efficiency. An artifact of 
this accounting measure is that it does not account for the intangible assets held by 
the firm, which is particularly relevant for young firms. However, the 
consequence of using a sample of private firms is that other measures of 
profitability also fail to account for this fact. The nature of the relation is difficult 
to predict in advance, given the mixed effects that profitability has on ownership 
concentration. 
Leverage is measured by the value of debt as a fraction of the book value of 
assets. Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) argue that leverage as an explanatory 
variable captures on one hand the relative gains or losses from movements in 
interest rates and on the other hand the value added by creditors’ monitoring role. 
Along with the present value of tax shields, gains from movements in interest 
rates add value to the company. Because leverage also implies potential 
bankruptcy costs, it is difficult to assess the nature of the relationship. Another 
aspect is that creditors monitor management, and from this point of view, 
ownership concentration is less likely to increase. 
The proxy for growth is the historical average percentage growth in sales for the 
past three years. Particularly young firms are characterized by high growth 
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opportunities. In addition, in young firms ownership is more likely to be 
concentrated in the hands of owner-managers (Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2009). From 
this point of view, we expect to find a positive relation. 
Managerial ownership is described by the fraction owned by officers. Other 
measures in the literature include the fraction owned by both officers and 
directors. Using this measure, Falenbrach and Stulz (2009) found that in young 
firms there is a high level of managerial ownership. They interpret this as a 
response to the limited access of young firms to capital markets. In this case, 
managerial ownership can be viewed as a cheap source of financing. 
To account for the amenity potential that, according to Demsetz and Lehn’s 
(1985) findings, is present in firms in the media industry, we use a dummy 
variable which takes a value of one if the firm belongs to the media industry and 
zero otherwise. We do so only for media firms, because the authors found 
evidence that the amenity potential leads to higher ownership concentration in this 
particular type of firms. 
In the second set-up the variables will be measured as first order differences. We 
choose this approach because the ownership concentration in levels is a highly 
persistent variable. Also, the model captures the nature and intensity of the 
relationships between variables. Measuring changes provides additional insight 
into the way ownership concentration adjusts to variation in the set of 
determinants. 
As estimation technique, we use the OLS framework. Multivariate regressions are 
performed across firms for each of the ten sample years. This approach is useful 
to test whether the relations are persistent in time and not due to a particularity 
that affects the variables in a given period. 
In addition to the base-case model presented above, we also test the model on a 
family firm subsample, due to their unique sample characteristics, as well as to the 
fact that the family firm is the dominant firm type among private firms. We also 
apply the model to subsamples consisting of several investor types: foreign, 
industrial (nonfinancial), institutional (financial), state, and individual (personal) 
owners, as identified by Bøhren et al. (2009). With this approach we intend to 
determine whether different investors react differently to changes in firm 
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characteristics. The analysis of Bøhren et al. (2009) shows that large foreign and 
financial investors are more likely to sell and also large investors in general sell 
when the firm has short-term projects or has a history of high earnings. 
The set of alternative measures that is used to test the robustness of the model is 
listed in Table 1. 
Table 7. 
Variable Measure Definition 
Ownership 
concentration 
OCH Herfindahl index: sum of squared fractions across 
all owners (Demsetz and Lehn 1985) 
Firm size Size_sales Avearge annual sales 
Relative 
riskiness 
SD_profit Difference between the ratio of the firm’s standard 
deviation of net profit to its average profit and the 
ratio of the industry’s standard deviation of profit to 
industry average profit 
Profitability ROE Return on equity: profit after tax divided by equity 
 ROA Return on assets: profit after tax divided by total 
assets (Gregoric, Masten, and Zajc 2008) 
Leverage Liq/A Liquid assets divided by total assets 
Growth 
prospects 
Growth_fut Average percentage growth in sales over the next 
three years 
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